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Abstract 
Increasing demand from consumers plus European Union (EU) legislation has raised awareness 
within the automotive production sector of the urgent need to reduce the environmental impacts from 
the three main stages in vehicle life – car manufacture, car use and end-of life vehicle processing. 
The paper reviews how the originator and manufacturer of the smartTM automobile has worked 
directly with its main system partners to address environmental issues in these three stages while 
optimizing performance across the parameters of commercial viability. This required the creation of 
strategic relationships within the supply chain. Overall, this innovative approach is viewed in the 
context of a total product system. The smartTM car highlights the following critical areas: use of 
modularity in product design and production facility layout; emphasis on partner participation from 
product creation to after sales; and use of a highly customized build-to-order product system to 
‘green’ the entire supply chain. 
In particular, the case study compares the process characteristics employed at the smartTM car 
factory, called ‘smartville’, to more ‘traditional’ approaches to vehicle manufacture. It examines these 
issues in a preliminary attempt to establish the actual or potential reduction of environmental impact 
in the three stages of vehicle life, including the role of main suppliers in this process.  
 
Key words:  
total product system, MCC smartTM, sustainability, recyclability, automobile components,  
ELV (end of life vehicle), supply chain, modularity, product lifecycle. 
NOTE: smartTM is a DaimlerChrysler trademark and as such smartTM is implied in all cases. The word 
is not capitalized as part of this trademark process. 
 
Introduction 
 
For readers who are unfamiliar with it, the smartTM car is a two-seat city-car. Major events in the 
development of this project, including its extension to new smartTM models, are indicated in BOX 1, 
and the global unit sales figures are shown in Table 1 (Birch, 1997, Mildenberger, 2000). The 
production of very small automobiles has a long history in Europe, partly because of the constraints 
of ancient street layouts and as a means for bringing car ownership within the reach of lower income 
households. Recent developments reflect increasing concern for the environment, and increasing 
congestion in many European cities. 
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In general, the historical story of smartTM can be seen to have these major steps: product creation 
from 1992-1994, product realisation from 1995-1998 and market penetration, albeit in limited 
quantities, from 1999-2002. Table 1 shows the relatively low uptake of smartTM into the predominantly 
European market. The story continues with the smartTM product range expanding both in the form of 
new vehicles, but also in the form of accessing transport to the general public. In the broadest sense 
the end user (e.g .the customer) should be considered within the entire supply chain along with the 
major automobile sub-components suppliers that one may usually think of. This paper attempts to 
address how much does the smartTM automobile really represent a total product system concept, and 
more importantly in which areas of the supply chain system does it exceed other vehicle products. 
Conversely there are parts of the smartTM system which need further innovation for smartTM to 
become a more holistic product, for example the increased integration of smartTM use for transport for 
those who do not privately own a vehicle. Firstly a short overview of how smartTM fits into the 
European car market is presented. Beyond this the paper explores the way smartTM works with 
various systems suppliers to achieve best in class supply chain management, especially when 
considering the drive to incorporate practices which are considered to be less environmentally 
damaging. 
 
BOX 1: Important events in the history of smart™, sources: authors’ interviews and survey. 
 
1972 
 
A radical project proposal for a 2.5 metre length car for town centres was considered by 
Mercedes for the year 2000.  Project was shelved. 
 
July 1992 
 
The executive committee of Daimler Benz is shown the prototype for a city automobile in the 
design studio.  The committee gives the go ahead. Meanwhile, Nicholas Hayek, the SMH 
Chairman coins the term Swatch-mobile and claims a working prototype exists. 
 
Dec 1992 –
Jan 1993 
 
Hayek meets with Mercedes officials to show them what types of panel design and 
interior/exterior he is working on. 
 
March 1994 
 
The Micro Compact Car (MCC AG) joint venture is formed between Mercedes Benz AG and 
SMH Group.  (Swiss Corporation for Microelectronics and Watchmaking Industries). 
 
June 1994 
 
Large numbers of prototypes are built and tested to high mileage. 
 
Oct 1995 
 
Foundation stone laid at Hambach, France, for a highly innovative manufacturing plant, – 
smartville – following rejection of some 50 other sites. 
 
Sept 1997 
 
smartTM is premiered at Frankfurt International Motor Show. 
Oct 1997 smartTM factory officially opens. 
 
Oct 1998 
 
smart™s begin to come to market after some initial chassis problems and quality issues. 
 
Nov 1998 
 
Daimler-Benz merges with Chrysler to form DaimlerChrysler (DC). 
 
Dec 1998 
 
Mercedes Benz (cars & truck division of DC) takes full responsibility for MCC smartTM. 
 
1999 
 
Internet sales launched. 
 
1999 
 
smartTM centres (including sales and services network)  re-launched under Mercedes 
stewardship. 
 
2000 
 
Further integration of smartTM network into DC. 
 
2001-2002 
 
Right hand drive models launched in Japan and UK. 
 
2003 
 
smartTM Roadster scheduled for release. 
2004 
 
4-seat smartTM scheduled for series production. 
 
In several respects, the smartTM car fits the criteria for an ideal city car. Its two seat capacity matches 
the European average vehicle occupancy of 1.2 persons per vehicle, while small size is combined 
with a high standard of safety. It is spacious inside yet still small enough to be very convenient for 
Page 2 of 15 
Warren, Rhodes & Carter: a case study of the smart ™ automobile  
congested city driving. It also has comparatively low environmental impact, not just in use but over all 
stages of the lifecycle. Neither fuel efficient small cars nor two cars are unique in Europe, but smartTM 
is innovative in several respects. This reflects its emergence from a partnership between Mercedes 
and Swatch – see BOX 1. It draws strength from Mercedes’ presence behind the smartTM brand, the 
standard of product engineering, lively performance, a high standard of interior specification, and an 
emphasis on safety. The influence of Swatch is reflected in a strong fashion element in interior and 
exterior styling. These attributes combine to bring environmentally conscious car use closer to higher 
income, city-based consumers. The striking design of smartTM is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: A fleet of smartTM cars at a dealership awaiting collection by customers. 
 
Important elements of innovation follow from emphasis on modularity in contrasting modes, including 
mobility. The physical modularity of smartTM is immediately apparent through the visually striking use 
of plastic body panels. These are a direct reference to one of the original partners involved, SMH – 
who pioneered plastic watches in the form of Swatch watches. The panels on the smartTM are 
replaceable, allowing end users to re-configure the colour of the vehicle for a cost that amounts to 
approximately 10% of the original vehicle purchase price. An example of this high use of modularity 
can be seen in Figure 2, which is the major body component on which most of the larger sub-
components are either attached or fitted. This ‘cell’, or cage, acts as not only the body but it also 
incorporates the crumble zones required to achieve the high ratings in the European crash tests. In 
design terms the cell gives the car a prominent line since the cell is visible on the exterior. The use of 
the cell within the smartTM assembly has been compared to the way aviation manufacturers make the 
most of aerospace frames when building aircraft. 
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FIGURE 2: The TridionTM safety cell, after complete assembly, by Magna Chassis, being 
conveyed to the main smartTM car production line. 
 
The car was originally targeted as a second car, largely for city use, but it was also associated with 
initiatives that envisaged alternative approaches to individuals’ mobility. These offered incentives for 
using cars like smartTM outside the prevailing owner-driver model. They include reduced public 
transportation fares for inter-modal journeys, reduced parking fees, preferential car rental 
agreements, and incentives for car sharing. In some parts of the EU, these initiatives have started to 
evolve – for example, via lower charges for parking and for car-wash – the latter reflecting lower use 
of water, detergents etc. SmartTM thus appears to be contributing to reducing impact from personal 
vehicle use, but on a limited scale so far, as is indicated by the unit sales figures previously shown in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Annual unit sales of smartTM
Source ANE 2001, 2002; Automotive News 2000 (provided courtesy of JATO Dynamics) 
 
Year  Units sold 
1998 17,000 
1999 79,900 
2000 102,100 
2001              101,937 
 
This paper provides a preliminary consideration of the impact of smartTM across the total process of 
production, product use, and end-of-life processing within the concept of a total product system. As 
will be seen, this involves both the vehicle manufacturer (MCC – Micro Compact Car), and its 
partners in the supply chain.   
 
Supply chains, networks, and ‘total product systems’  
 
Increasingly, large companies in the EU and the US are emphasizing ‘management of the supply 
chain’. They attempt to manage the highly complex flows of materials, components, order and other 
information that extend through the various stages in the manufacture and distribution of end 
products. The focus of competition is thus moving away from competition between individual 
companies towards competition between supply chains –more accurately, between supply networks. 
Through combinations of methods such as concurrent engineering, kaizen and product life planning 
which are applied throughout a supply chain, they aim for continuous extension of competitiveness. 
The emphasis on supply chain co-ordination has a number of roots, including attempts to match 
current highly demanding, diverse market conditions, and the application of information and 
communications technologies in business-to-business electronic commerce. Long established 
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methods developed by leading Japanese companies – especially, Toyota – and their manifestation in 
competitive success have been particularly influential. While this influence was initially seen in 
manufacturing sectors, it is now evident in service sectors.  
 
These methods emphasize long term close relationships between companies and their suppliers. The 
role of large companies that occupy strategic positions close to the point of delivery to consumers 
and other end customers are particularly significant; examples range from vehicle manufacturer to 
retailing. Typically, these are prime movers that seek to co-ordinate activities across all the diverse 
stages and types of activity – from raw materials processing through to the assembly of end products. 
This co-ordination is mainly undertaken indirectly through collaborative relationships with core 
suppliers who take responsibility for the design and supply of main product systems and/or sub-
systems. The core suppliers also seek to manage their own supplier base – the network of 
companies involved in the system or sub-system for which they are responsible. Longer term, the 
process shifts emphasis away from performance within individual companies to performance across a 
network of companies.  
 
In the ideal-type model, the total supply chain is co-ordinated across all areas and stages of activity. 
One of the critical elements of this model is the comparatively high proportion of total production 
costs accounted for by the supplier base – typically 70% or more. For large companies, such as most 
western car manufacturers, this represents a large scale shift from ‘traditional’, vertically integrated, 
mass-production – referred to later as ‘the traditional model’. In this model, the main company 
undertakes most types of activity internally, and may account for 70% or more of total production 
costs. Another central element is the use of ‘just-in-time’ approaches to production. In their mature 
forms, these provide high standards of product quality at each production stage, with emphasis on 
very low batch sizes within flexible, high variety, production flows.  
 
At all stages, production flows are ‘pulled’ by actual demand for different product variants. There is 
emphasis on minimal, ideally zero, levels of waste, such as those arising from producing faulty parts, 
or from high levels of stocks and work-in-process. Wider emphasis on the efficient use of resources 
within companies and across supply chains – affecting use of human resources, production capital, 
space and logistics – has been captured in the concept of ‘lean production’ (Womack et al, 1990).  
 
The environmental impact of these fundamental shifts in the organization of production appears, in 
general, to be positive – although systematic comparisons do not appear to have been undertaken 
and face considerable difficulties. For instance, the impact of just-in-time methods is necessarily 
associated with very low levels of defects in the supply of components etc. and, where suppliers are 
efficient, with commensurately low levels of waste of materials, energy, human effort and storage 
space. However, just-in-time (JIT) supply can also be associated with relatively high environmental 
impact from the transport movements – those needed for the collection and delivery of small part lots. 
Furthermore, JIT systems can lead to an overall increase in environmental impacts, especially when 
overall deliveries increase to such a point where local congestion delays the supply of components. It 
should be clear that various scenarios need to be examined carefully before implementation.  
 
The performance of all stages of the supply chain in terms of resource use and impacts became a 
focus of attention as a consequence of environmental regulation by regional, national and other 
bodies, and following initiatives requiring traceability such as ISO 9000. However, assessment of 
environmental impact needs to extend beyond the point of sale to take in total product life. This is 
partly because businesses are increasingly aiming to generate, or to increase, revenue flows in the 
‘aftermarket’. They now view performance in this area as important for total competitiveness. This 
stage extends from the point of sale through to a product’s end-of-life, and emphasis is moving 
beyond supply of replacement parts towards provision of a variety of services that support or 
enhance product use and functionality. Assisted by Internet based links, badge manufacturers seek 
to sustain long term relationships with customers, such as by providing on-line diagnosis of appliance 
faults and linked, rapid response from warranty support services.  
 
Recent environmental regulation in the EU has also focused attention on the aftermarket stage of 
product life. Much of this relates to the performance of products in their use. In the case of non-
durable products, this may aim to reduce the overall environmental impact through, say, return of 
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packaging for reuse. For durable products from refrigerators to cars, such regulation is establishing 
mandatory performance targets, most obviously in terms of energy efficiency and emissions levels. 
This should encompass the extension of product life, such as through the refurbishment or re-
manufacture of products in the later stages of their use (Guide et al, 2000). But again, similar to JIT, 
lifetime optimisation which leads to a longer lifetime can sometimes result in higher environmental 
impacts. In other words different products will require different optimisations, but for the major 
investments required for tooling, pressing, etc. in vehicle body manufacture, a core body which 
remains stable for more than 7-10 years can in theory lower environmental impacts.  
 
The developing EU standards also focus attention on the final stage in product life – end-of-life 
processing. Pressure to improve environmental performance in this stage is partly indirect, for 
example, following from increasing restrictions on, and rising costs of, disposal in landfill sites. It also 
results directly from mandatory recycling targets and from requirements that manufacturers take 
responsibility for collecting their products at the end of their life and for optimising their reprocessing.  
 
Growing emphasis on the environmental characteristics of product performance, and on end-of-life 
reprocessing, is reshaping approaches within production systems – such as in product design, in 
materials selection and in manufacturing processes. Revenue driven approaches to product support 
throughout the aftermarket stage add to a need for companies to focus on the total product life cycle. 
This can involve long time scales since supporting a product through to the end-of-life extends, for 
instance, beyond ten years for cars, and twenty five years or more in aviation. Within these long 
timescales, there is scope for ‘re-manufacture’ – of components and/or of the total product – to 
support life extension, for either the product owners or new users. The potential economic viability of 
this approach is indicated by Guide et al (op cit) who provide examples of re-manufacture and of high 
levels of profitability. To establish the full extent of the environmental impact of products, particularly 
those which require energy and other material inputs for functioning, and of the full potential for 
reducing those impacts, requires approaches that extend well beyond concern with the supply chain. 
This entails a focus on the total product system, encompassing the full cradle to grave product cycle, 
and the wide range of actors and interactions involved. This focus leads to emphasis on the 
development of sustainable product systems.  
 
We address some of these issues in relation to the smartTM car. 
 
Creation of a total product system 
 
The Mercedes-Benz automobile division (part of Daimler Chrysler [DC]) took full responsibility for the 
smartTM car and for MCC smartTM when SMH (Swatch) withdrew from the project in 1998. In a recent 
presentation a DC representative explained how they had developed an approach that incorporated a 
new brand, a new way of production and a new method of sales distribution (Renschler, 2000). This 
they did in a relatively short period of time but not without incurring substantial costs and product 
launch problems.  
 
It is clear that launching the smartTM car could not have been achieved without the strong support of 
core suppliers whose plants are co-located with the main assembly factory in smartville, located in 
Hambach, France. The approach reflects Toyota’s methods, but joint development on a greenfield 
site by MCC smartTM and lead suppliers has pushed the model substantially forward. Mercedes 
forged strong links with these suppliers through their involvement in product design from very early 
stages. These “system partners” shared in product development, taking much of the responsibility for 
major modules such as the cockpit and complete door assemblies, beside sharing in investment and 
financial risk. They developed their own solutions to component design and sourcing, within 
parameters agreed with the lead company – MCC. Some of the main elements of the contrast 
between the approach at smartville and ‘traditional’ models are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Process characteristics in the supply chain for a ‘typical automotive factory’ and for 
smartville 
 
Process Traditional ‘smartville’ 
(a) product 
design and 
development 
little collaboration with 
suppliers 
bidding for job after product is 
proto-typed 
systems partners have a large responsibility to collaborate and achieve 
lower costs 
work with supplier very early in design stage 
(b) ordering and 
purchasing 
short term, focused on 
supplier price – not supplier 
cost and capabilities  
 
long term contracts, emphasis on cost rather than price, with supply to 
advanced  JIT standards 
(c) supplier–lead 
manufacturer 
relationship 
arm’s length very close 
classed as partners 
(d) remuneration 
of production 
employees 
salaried, bonus decided by 
upper-management 
highly tiered payment 
hierarchical 
self-set teams with objectives (bonus to 12%) 
much flatter structures 
(e) production 
layout: 
far apart, historical layout, no 
room to grow 
brown and greenfield site, integrated; basis for potential growth 
(f) production 
facility: 
historically based with legacy 
problems 
designed from scratch, best in class for environment and workers 
(g) warranty 
responsibility: 
sole to final assembler shared by all, traceability to individual component producers 
(h) payment 
terms 
when shipped to assembler when final product complete or sold to customer 
(i) supplier 
facilities 
owned by supplier land owned by assembler, total Hambach site managed by the vehicle 
assembler and on-site suppliers  
 
 
We emphasize the summary nature of Table 2 and our concentration on the issue of incorporating 
environmentally sensitive practices within the supply chain. This must be viewed in the context of two 
reservations. First, the development of the smartTM car, has been followed by other vehicle 
assemblers who have surpassed some of the environmental targets set for smartTM. Second, while 
Table 2 concentrates on issues of production organization, the wider limitations of the smartTM 
example need to be kept in mind. For instance, the introduction of smartTM car has not been 
accompanied by the extension of associated mobility concepts on any substantial scale. SmartTM has 
not yet succeeded in moving the private user away from personal vehicle habits anymore than any 
other mobility project. Clearly further thinking is needed with this issue probably with government 
intervention and some form of policy implementation.  
 
Some examples illustrate the items in Table 2. Concerning 3 (a) and (c), the extensive use of 
partnerships for collaborative solutions seems to be more effective than, say, solutions developed in 
traditional ‘arms length’ relationships where waste of effort, energy and materials, and the investment 
health and innovative capabilities of a supplier are little concern to those purchasing components etc. 
An example of the collaborative approach at smartville is a large cost-reduction programme (Target 
smartTM), which involved the partners in generating ideas for modifying specifications to reduce costs. 
Approximately 15% of the cost was cut from many of the components with about 60% of these 
savings achieved through renegotiation with suppliers (Chew, 2001a). In some cases, MCC 
accompanied its partners on visits to component makers to expose various ‘tear-down’ prices of sub-
components. MCC were able to utilise Daimler-Chrysler information on various shared sub-
components in order to compare costs in a benchmarking exercise with MCC’s partners. The other 
40% of savings came in the form of re-engineering suggestions from the partners and their suppliers 
(Chew, 2001a).  
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These savings followed from the revision of specifications to match a small car profile rather than the 
more expensive premium engineering solutions that characterize Mercedes. Because some MCC 
suppliers already manufactured components for other car manufacturers in the small car segment, it 
was relatively straightforward to transfer this product knowledge to the smartTM. One example 
included an axle assembly which was modified to reduce material costs as well as to increase driving 
performance (Chew, 2001a). In another example, cost savings were made through transfer of 
assembly of a Bosch headlamp sub-component from smartville to the Czech Republic. The use of 
competitive logistic calculations also generated a cost savings. 
 
These benefits identified within 3 (b), (e) and (f) are: 
 
• direct delivery to auto-assembly line (via extensive conveyor systems); 
• no inspection by assembler when parts received; 
• direct ordering with shared responsibility for stock control; 
• partners have their own entry ports into MCC’s assembly area. 
 
Each of these gains contributes towards greening of the supply chain and to higher levels of 
production efficiency. For instance, emphasis on consistent high standard conformance with quality 
standards at all production stages maximizes efficiency in the use of energy and materials. Where 
components can be made locally, large scale reductions in packaging waste and in transport-
generated emissions become possible. It is estimated that more than 95% of the transport costs for 
the main modules have been reduced compared to a typical automotive assembly plant (Treneman, 
2001). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: A complete pair of doors from the Magna doors production facility ready for fitting 
to the vehicle. 
 
Furthermore, with direct ordering and correct sequencing of modular units (for example engine type, 
wheel/tyre configuration, interior/exterior colour, door panels, etc.) a built-to-order (BTO) production 
system can be achieved. In an efficient BTO system, no vehicle is assembled without a final (named) 
consumer or other end-user. BTO appears likely to contribute to reduced environmental impact – for 
example, stocks are minimized because manufacture is largely confined to units for which firm orders 
have already been placed. Using BTO incorporates consumers’ actual demands as a controlling input 
to the production process. For instance, production of vehicles with unpopular colours or features 
should, ideally, be avoided. Where a high level of co-ordination has been developed across the 
various stages and branches of a supply chain, reductions linked to BTO extend throughout the 
production network.  
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Furthermore, experience in low inventory production systems shows clearly that the wasted energy, 
materials and so on that are associated with rework and mislaid or damaged components in poorly 
organized production systems, can be expected to reduce correspondingly. Further gains follow from 
reduced transport and storage. But direct measurement of the effects of BTO is difficult - see Hines, 
2002 for a discussion of the issues. An example of a completed sub-unit is shown in Figure 3, the 
delivery of the doors to the production line. Door panels are produced by Dynamit Nobel and colour 
coated by Cubic Europe both located at smartville. The panels are then configured by Magna Doors 
and supplied as required to the line in pairs. Each pair of doors is BTO with specific interior and 
exterior colour choices and variants, and these are delivered in pairs to the appropriate vehicle under 
construction at the required time. The interior door fittings are shown in Figure 4. 
 
In Table 2 (g), (h) and (i) the sharing of risks is shown, in both the warranty of components and the 
potential loss or increase of the overall business of the product. The main impact of co-location is that 
the vehicle manufacturer, as site owner can  look holistically at the entire site in order to carry out a 
comprehensive assessment of resource use on the site. The factory buildings (see Table 2 (f)) are all 
built from sustainable materials, and all processes within smartville are both CFC and formaldehyde 
free (Treneman, 2001). The factory also recycles the heat and power created and water used on the 
site. With off-site suppliers, additional environmental burdens need to be added to the overall 
analysis. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Detail of the left hand side door interior, showing fittings.  
 
 
 
Panels: an example of modularity within an increased product range  
 
The offer of a modular product to customers includes the opportunity to update or change the colour 
of the car by replacing door and other panels. As yet, it is not clear how frequently this will occur per 
car-lifetime. (An indicator may be provided by a smartTM supplier who claimed that businesses have 
developed – in Italy – to provide replacement panels to fashion conscious consumers on a short term 
rental basis.) This facility can be interpreted in several ways from an environmental perspective. For 
the consumer, extending a product’s utility by updating its appearance is a bonus point from which, in 
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theory all parties gain something. Less obvious to end users is that a more extensive colour range is 
needed. SmartTM regularly changes the colour range, but previous colours need to be available for 
repairs, offsetting other environmental benefits. A further factor is the potential for reduced impact 
from model updates. Traditional automobile facelifts occur  regularly during the product lifecycle, 
supported by development expenditure to ensure the latest features are incorporated so that market 
competitiveness is sustained. Increasingly, these changes are preplanned in the initial stage of model 
development as part of product life planning.  
 
The body panels (door panels, front and rear outer-skin) play a central role in product refresh. They 
are comprised of Noryl GTX polyphenylene oxide resin produced by GE Plastics (Pryweller, 1998). 
The component manufacturers worked with MCC on the plastic body components. Part of the total 
product design process involved selecting materials that would limit environmental impact, and that 
would behave as a rigid plastic. The major panels are injection molded by Dynamit Nobel AG, 
including front fender, outer door, front, rear valence and wheel arch panels. The panels are then 
unitized to form a single wrap-around body product. Due the high precision of the molding process, 
very little scrap waste is produced, and that is collected for recycling into the feedstock of the injection 
process. Panels are produced in 4 basic plastic colours and then painted by electrostatic powder 
paint processes that eliminate all solvents, sludge and effluent (Treneman, 2001). The panels are 
100% recyclable thermoplastic which are designed to be reversibly deformable, avoiding dents from 
parking bumps and impacts of up to speeds of 15 mph (Birch, 1997). This type of life-long design is 
important to ensure increased resistance to damage in the minimal parking space of many European 
cities.  
 
The plastic panels have a single clear paint overcoat to enhance resistance to fading. The absence of 
primer and base coats saves some 50% of the costs of a typical painted body (Pryweller, 1998) 
reducing the resource impact of manufacture. In addition to high strength and bright colour, the use of 
plastics reduces overall vehicle weight. The car mass is about 725 kg – some 300 kg less than typical 
steel body compact vehicles (Pryweller, 1998; Wrigley, 2000). In the case of door panel manufacture, 
analysis of the total product system needs to consider the trade-offs between plastic and other 
materials. An important factor in comparison is the predicted vehicle unit volume, since the dies used 
for plastic panels have an expected life time of only some 200,000 vehicle platforms (Pryweller, 
1998). In contrast, metal pressing dies can generally be used over a much larger volume – potentially 
over the entire product life time. Another consideration is consumer opinion. Steel and aluminium 
tend to be viewed as safer than plastic – regardless of what vehicle safety tests show.  Such 
perceptions can be difficult to change.  
 
Extending model diversity 
 
The smartTM brand is being extended to other products, most notably a 4-seat, 5 door smartTM. This 
will require additional production facilities. In a simplistic view, this growth is counter to green 
practices within the supply chain. At first glance, a doubling in component diversity could be seen as 
having a major adverse impact on both supply chain efficiency and the environmental burden.  But 
the variants of smartTM that will be built at Hambach will share more than 50% of the same modular 
components (Chew, 2001a). This use of common components for multiple products is well known 
and documented within the automotive industry. One example of this is the way that Volkswagen has 
used common vehicle platform architecture across a wide range of various branded car products – 
like the VW Polo, the SEAT Ibiza and Skoda Fabia – these cars all share a platform called ‘PQ24’ 
(Chew, 2001b). A product platform is composed of necessary modules. Thus, although a platform 
can not be developed ‘as a module’, it is indeed based on modules, using a modular structure. The 
new Polo and the Fabia share over 150 major components including chassis, engines, and cooling 
sub-systems. This common sharing reduces labour intensive dual design pathways, achieving 
substantial savings in development costs (Chew, 2001b). The use of vehicle platforms will have a 
major factor in both economical savings but also gains in environmental impact.  
 
The new four seat (five door) smartTM will use a new version of  the TridionTM safety cell developed for 
the original smartTM. It will be built in the NedCar factory in Born, Nederlands in conjunction with a 
Daimler Chrysler partner – Mitsubishi Motors Corporation. This vehicle will compete in the most 
competitive market segment within the European automotive industry – one in which DC has limited 
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experience beyond the Mercedes A-Class (Maynard, 2001). To succeed in this arena, the final 
product will need to be unique, cost-effective, have the highest levels of safety and environmentally-
friendliness (in terms of overall emissions) and lastly be a high volume sales item (Maynard, 2001). 
This is a particularly acute point, since the original smartTM is not forecast to be profitable until 2004-
2005. Both smartTM and Mitsubishi branded vehicles will be produced under the shared platform 
philosophy (Ostle, 2000). This new vehicle is due to start production in 2004, with DC jumping into a 
previously planned minicar platform that Mitsubishi had been designing. DC will be expecting to make 
large economies of scale from part sharing between the current smartTM car, the smartTM 4-seater and 
new small products from Mitsubishi. In the next section the smartTM is examined as a mobility concept 
from the perspective of personal ownership and finally how the product progresses into mobility 
services. 
 
 
The ‘in-use’ product phase 
 
In the EU, smartTM competes directly with various models – although these are mostly larger in overall 
dimensions, are heavier and have higher fuel consumption. Currently, smartTM represents one of the 
lowest emissions cars available on the market in Europe. It also comes close to the 3 litre fuel target 
(where a vehicle can achieve 100 km driving distance using only 3 litres of fuel). The original smartTM 
concept envisaged a purely electric or a hybrid drive train system. This was not pursued in the 
production car, but this may yet come to market. MCC smartTM has been working with Zytek to 
produce electric and diesel hybrid prototypes (Tremble, 2001). 
 
The major difference between smartTM and its various competitors is that, while it combines 
fashionable design with high standards of safety and interior specification, it also contributes to 
reductions in environmental impacts, such as those arising from vehicle  emissions. These factors are 
important in terms of the overall product ‘package’ that the end user purchases. About 80% of the 
environmental impact in the total product life cycle is attributable to the in-use phase (Mildenberger, 
2000). Much of this impact results from the high lifetime mileage of a vehicle. Examples of the in-use 
emissions of the smartTM product and five other well know vehicles which compete directly with 
smartTM are shown in Table 3. The in-use emissions are derived from vehicle certification data based 
on all the various model types for sale in the UK, using the Euro 3 standard test for emissions. Note 
that certain smartTM competitors are not sold in the UK, such as the Renault Twingo. The vehicle 
manufacturers and models are not shown here for brevity. 
 
Table 3 summarises carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and fuel consumption (FC) as indicated by the 
fuel used to drive 100 km. The total emissions value (in g/km) is the sum of carbon monoxide (CO), 
hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM) all in grams per kilometre 
over the standard European test cycle. This represents a total emissions factor for the vehicle, where 
higher overall values are worse for the environment. Clearly, the level of emissions from consumer 
use depends on the actual driving cycle employed together with the condition of the vehicle and the 
associated  sub-components (e.g. state of the catalyst system).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of emissions and fuel consumption for selected minicars,  
derived from Vehicle Certification Agency (VCA), Bristol, UK. 
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Vehicle CO2  
(g/km) 
Fuel 
Consumption  
(litre/100 km) 
Total Emissions 
(g/km) 
smart™, 
diesel 
118 3.4 0.634 
smart™, 
petrol 
122 5.0 0.524 
Model A, 
petrol 
149 6.3 1.652  
Model B, 
petrol 
160 6.4 0.559 
Model C, 
diesel 
119 4.4 1.031 
Model D, 
petrol 
149 6.3 0.431 
Model E, 
petrol 
161 6.1 0.830 
 
 
In summary, the smartTM is an efficient vehicle that has a lower emissions impact on the environment 
and lower use of non-renewable resources than similar cars that it competes with.  However, overall 
sales of the smartTM are, so far, lower than most of its direct competitors, so that only a limited impact 
has been achieved when looking at fleet wide averages. SmartTM also meets many of the forward 
looking requirements set by various research bodies, and compares favorably with the current 
vehicles on sale in the European market. For instance, the smartTM represents a big step in the 
direction identified by the UK’s Foresight programme. This programme stipulates that mass market 
vehicles in 2020 need to embody the qualities shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Vehicle qualities required for 2020, adapted from DTI 1999. 
Parameter Requirement – to: 
clean have the lowest environmental impact 
efficient make best used of limited fuel resources 
lightweight use less energy to achieve mobility 
telematic communicate with other cars and network to 
optimise existing road structure use 
intelligent provide enhanced safety 
lean be manufactured competitively 
 
 
 
 
When related to other benchmarking criteria, such as the environmentally optimised vehicle 
(Nieuwenhuis, 1997), smartTM appears to provide a major step towards the criteria identified for cars 
in the future. Under the broad umbrella of requirements in Table 4, the smartTM scores high values for 
use of radical innovations that contribute environmental benefits. This compares favourably with the 
average vehicle parc standard. The European Commission has considered a strategy to reduce 
carbon dioxide based on this type of benchmarking, although this has yet to be implemented fully. 
Examples of the efficiency, cleanliness and low weight were previously reviewed. SmartTM’s TridionTM 
steel safety cage, the airbags and purpose designed crumple box zones demonstrate smartTM’s  high 
standard of safety. The smartTM has also been linked with programmes to incorporate telematic 
practices to reduce environmental impact. This is discussed in the following section. 
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Extension of the total product system into mobility services 
 
The original smartTM concept envisaged that a wide range of mobility services would be offered to 
smartTM owners through a package to be offered as ‘smartmove’. In some cases, these services were 
to be offered at discounted rates to offer incentives, via preferential treatment, to encourage customer 
purchase in relation to cars with a greater environmental impact. Examples of these services include 
preferential rental rates for smartTM cars, and similar vehicles, such as when renting  during visits 
abroad. Preferentially treatment can be, and has been extended to parking spaces. Potentially it can 
be extended to tariffs on ferries and trains, through lower prices compared to those for larger 
vehicles. The potential for links with various transport providers, including vehicle hire companies, 
opens up the possibility that owning a car may not be the only convenient way, or the ‘best’ way for a 
person to get from one place to another.  
 
Like other car manufacturers, smartTM has also looked at the use of person digital assistants and/or 
mobile telephones to access internet information, including vehicle routing/navigation, weather, 
electronic mail services and travel bookings. This is much easier than in a traditional car because the 
plastic roof module is transparent to the appropriate technology. By using a design partly purpose 
built for the application, the roof is already viable for the potential growth and changes expected in the 
telematics industry over the next few years.  
 
A further example is provided by the control and diagnostic system that is installed in smartTM cars. 
Like those installed in some other recent cars, this can be interrogated only by the authorized smartTM 
dealers, and information can be fed into the parent company’s data warehouse. The smartTM dealer 
network differs from others in the EU in that dealers are linked directly to smartville as franchisees. 
The overall effect is to lock all smartTM users into the DC/smartTM network. Thus, when some 3,000 
UK residents acquired smartTM cars in advance of the UK launch, their vehicles had to be taken to 
other European countries for service or repair. This apparent shift to a ‘captive customer base’ may 
have positive environmental benefits in so far as vehicle performance benefits from high standards of 
service and repair.  
 
The major automobile manufacturers recognize the importance of consumer demand for new types of 
services and the potential for increased revenues in the aftermarket. Accordingly, they appear to be 
shifting down the supply chain to offer customers some of these add-on services. This extension into 
services also signifies the increasing service orientation of manufacturers, indicating an operational 
shift towards the total product system. 
 
 
End-of-life provision 
 
Since smartTM has only been in production since 1998, the reality of this stage of the total product 
system has yet to be proven – as is also the case for life extension. However, the design of smartTM 
was undertaken with this stage – and the developing EU regulatory regime – in mind. This is reflected 
in two main ways. One is the choice of materials for their recycling potential – most obviously in the 
selection of plastics. As a result, smartTM claim that about 80% of the materials used in the 
construction of smartTM can be recycled – compared with an average of 70% for the car industry. The 
achievement of this target will draw support from the second design element – (vehicle) design that 
supports dismantling. The modular assembly of smartTM is accomplished, in some cases at least, by 
simplicity in the design of fastenings and fixings. For example, the cockpit module is inserted into 
smartTM as a single unit that is secured with just two bolts. This will support easy removal and 
separation of materials when the vehicle needs to be dismantled.  
 
Partnership with suppliers remains important in planning for the end-of-life phase and, eventually, in 
processing returned vehicles, Production partners are necessarily involved in the selection of 
recyclable materials and in design for dismantling. In relation to the other end of the life cycle, DC, 
like some other manufacturers, have explored partnership arrangements with specialist vehicle 
recyclers.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper illustrates how the concept of a sustainable total product system can be advanced by 
utilizing the extensive interactions between the lead product assembler – in this case MCC smartTM 
GmbH – and their suppliers. In order to qualify and quantify the environmentally aware practices 
within the total product system, it is necessary to look beyond the product life cycle and deconstruct 
the entire product system. The benefits of deep integration within the supply chain and assembler are 
quite clear in the case of smartTM which is essentially a more highly modularized vehicle than most in 
the mini-car segment. MCC smartTM has emphasized with great consistency the importance of 
building long term business relationships, in a similar way to that observed in successful Japanese 
automakers (Liker, 2000) operating in both Japan and the United States. The in-use phase also 
shows clear benefits for smartTM when compared to other similar segmented vehicles. What remains 
unclear to date, partly because smartTM is a relatively new vehicle, is how much impact the product 
has on extending environmentally friendly practices into the mobility, or the accessibility of being 
mobile beyond simple straightforward personal car ownership. Equally, the realities of end-life re-
processing remain to be demonstrated. However, the smartTM is a vehicle in which these issues have 
been directly addressed. It is to be expected that Daimler Chrysler will have learned from, and will 
apply where appropriate, the lessons gained from this experience, as from other elements of the 
smartTM development.  
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